Wednesday, June 17, 2009
Friday, March 20, 2009
Tuesday, August 5, 2008
QUE TAN MAL PUEDE PONERSE?
The USA: Double Bubble
While the Dow has fallen substantially in the last year, its inflation-adjusted value is still three times its long-term average, and more than 4 times its average prior to the start of this bubble. Even if the index falls merely to its long term average, it still has another 62% to go (in real terms) from its current level. If it reverts to its pre-bubble average, it has another 73% to go.
Figure 1
If those figures seem ludicrously pessimistic and unrealistic to you, take a look below at the CPI-adjusted Nikkei–which fell 82% from its peak at the end of 1989 to its low in 2003. At the time, most commentators blamed Japan’s Bubble Economy and subsequent financial crisis on the opaque and anti-competitive nature of its financial system. We were assured that nothing so ridiculous could happen in the transparent, competitive and well-regulated US financial system.
Yeah, right.
Figure 2
The story for the US housing market is little better. The index has already fallen 23% from its peak in 2006. A reversion to the long term mean implies a further 38% fall in the average house price in America; while reversion to the pre-Bubble mean implies a further 41% fall.
Write-downs by US financial institutions certainly haven’t yet factored in that degree of possible fall in housing values, and as Wilson Sy, the cheif economist at APRA, pointed out recently in two brilliant research papers (1 2), the banks’ “stress test” modeling greatly under-emphasizes the impact of such asset price falls on their financial viability. House price falls in the USA are far from over, and likewise “unexpected” write-downs by US financial institutions.
Figure 3
Overall, if US markets fall back to their pre-Bubble levels, the stock market will plunge about 80% from its peak (much the same degree of fall as applied in Japan) and the housing market will fall 55% (rather more than happened in Japan, where average house prices fell 44%–but less than Tokyo, where they fell over 70%).
The unique feature of this US asset bubble is that it affects both stocks and houses. There have been three Stock Market Bubbles in the USA in the last century: the “usual suspects” of the 1920s and 1980’s, but also one that doesn’t normally rate a mention: a ’60s Bubble that peaked in 1966, and was followed by a slump that only ended in mid-1982 (see Figure 6).
As Figure 6 indicates, this dual bubble has no precedent. Not only is it a bubble in both asset markets, both bubbles dwarf anything previously experienced. Even the great Roaring Twenties stock market bubble barely pokes its head above the long term average, compared to the 2000s Stock Market bubble–and in the 1920s, as Figure 4 shows, the housing market was relatively undervalued. The over-valuation of today’s housing market far exceeds the now comparatively minor bubble when Keating (Charles, not Paul) was on the loose in the USA.
Figure 4
While the Australian Stock Market is not as severely overvalued as the American, it is still substantially over its long term trend. Even after the recent falls, the inflation-adjusted All Ordinaries Index exceeds its level before Black Tuesday in 1987. It has another 30% to go before it will have reverted to the mean of the last 25 years (see Figure 5).
Figure 5
The prognosis for the Australian housing market is substantially worse. Even on short term data–covering only the last 22 years–the market could fall 40% if it reverted to the mean, and 50% if it reverted to the pre-bubble mean. Nigel Stapledon’s research into long term house prices in Australia–which is not shown here–implies an even greater potential for a fall in house prices.
Figure 6
Of course, such talk can seem nonsensical and alarmist. Especially if you ignore what happened in Japan.
Japan: the world’s most recent debt-deflation
Japan clearly underwent a debt-deflation after its “Bubble Economy” spectacularly burst in 1990. In its aftermath, house prices across Japan fell on average by 42%, and by over 70% in Tokyo (though they have since recovered slightly).
Figure 7
Figure 8
What has happened there can happen in Australia, the USA, and the rest of the OECD–especially since our Bubbles, while smaller than the Tokyo bubble, are larger than that for Japan as a whole (see Figure 9).
Figure 9
The killer behind the Bubble: Debt
The level of over-valuation of asset markets reflects the unprecedented scale of private debt, both here and in America–since the vast bulk of that debt was undertaken to finance “Ponzi” speculation on shares and housing. This is the reason that this recession will be so severe–as will the asset market bust.
Every “recovery” from a debt-induced recession since 1970 has involved resumption in the tendency for debt to grow faster than GDP (see Figure 12, where the once seemingly major debt crisis of the late 80s is now just a pimple on the upward trend of the debt ratio to its current unprecedented level).
Yet today the debt to GDP ratio is more than twice that of the Great Depression. It is simply cannot go any higher. Who else, after all, can banks lend to, now that they have exhausted the “subprime” market?
The only way for the debt to GDP ratio now is down (unless we’re unlucky enough to experience deflation, in which case the ratio will rise further, as in the Great Depression), and as it heads down, so will output and employment. A serious recession is inevitable.
Welcome to “the recession we can’t avoid”.
Figure 10
An “unexpected” fall in retail sales
Retail sales fell sharply in June, taking most economic commentators by surprise. Even perennial optimists, such as Shane Oliver, were forced to consider that the odds of a recession were “at least 40 percent”.
In reality, the fall in retail sales was inevitable. Spending in Australia has been driven by the biggest debt bubble in our history, and when that bubble peaked, spending had to fall. Since households had taken on a far larger share of debt than business during this bubble, the impact was bound to be seen first in retail sales, rather than investment spending, as I pointed out in November 2006:
“If households reduce their debt levels smoothly, they will have less disposable income to spend and retail sales will slump. If bankruptcies become widespread, the sales downturn will be overlaid with a financial crisis.” (Debtwatch, November 2006, p. 18;
See http://www.debtdeflation.com/blogs/p...twatch-reports
The suddenness of the turnaround is also no surprise, when you look at the data from a financial point of view. Just as your personal spending each year is the sum of your net income plus the change in your debt, aggregate spending for the economy is the sum of GDP plus the change in debt. As debt rises, the contribution made to spending by any change in debt also rises. Private debt–and household debt in particular–has risen so much in Australia that, at its peak, the change in debt was responsible for almost 20 percent of aggregate demand.
Figure 11
As is obvious in Figure 1, debt’s contribution peaked at the end of 2007, and it has been falling ever since. The monthly figures make this even more obvious (Figure 1 records change in debt over a whole year). The monthly increase in total private debt peaked at $30 billion in mid-2007, and trended up to $27 billion by the end of 2007. It has since fallen to a mere $5 billion in the month of June (see Table 1 and Figure 12).
Table 1
Figure 12
At some point, it will turn negative, and change in debt will therefore substract from aggregate demand rather than adding to it. Given that at its peak, debt financed almost 20 percent of demand, even stabilising debt at its current level–$1.85 trillion, compared to a GDP of $1.1 trillion–would result in a 20 percent fall in aggregate demand.
This hit will be felt by both asset and commodity markets: asset prices will fall, as will output and employment. The government’s attempts to counter this–by running a deficit rather than a surplus–will initially be swamped by the sheer scale of the turnaround in debt-financed spending. Even if the government runs a deficit of A$20 billion–the same scale as this year’s intended surplus–it will make up for less than a tenth of the fall in debt-financed spending.
The current “credit crunch” is, therefore, only the first act in a long-drawn out process of reducing debt levels. The second act will be “the recession we can’t avoid”. That recession–which will affect most of the OECD, since all major OECD nations bar France have suffered a similar blowout in private debt levels–will only add to the current decline in asset prices.
iTulip Select: The Investment Thesis for the Next Cycle™
__________________________________________________
To receive the iTulip Newsletter or iTulip Alerts, Join our FREE Email Mailing List
Copyright © iTulip, Inc. 1998 - 2007 All Rights Reserved
All information provided "as is" for informational purposes only, not intended for trading purposes or advice. Nothing appearing on this website should be considered a recommendation to buy or to sell any security or related financial instrument. iTulip, Inc. is not liable for any informational errors, incompleteness, or delays, or for any actions taken in reliance on information contained herein. Full Disclaimer
__________________
Ed.
Last edited by FRED; Yesterday at 06:47 PM.
While the Dow has fallen substantially in the last year, its inflation-adjusted value is still three times its long-term average, and more than 4 times its average prior to the start of this bubble. Even if the index falls merely to its long term average, it still has another 62% to go (in real terms) from its current level. If it reverts to its pre-bubble average, it has another 73% to go.
Figure 1
If those figures seem ludicrously pessimistic and unrealistic to you, take a look below at the CPI-adjusted Nikkei–which fell 82% from its peak at the end of 1989 to its low in 2003. At the time, most commentators blamed Japan’s Bubble Economy and subsequent financial crisis on the opaque and anti-competitive nature of its financial system. We were assured that nothing so ridiculous could happen in the transparent, competitive and well-regulated US financial system.
Yeah, right.
Figure 2
The story for the US housing market is little better. The index has already fallen 23% from its peak in 2006. A reversion to the long term mean implies a further 38% fall in the average house price in America; while reversion to the pre-Bubble mean implies a further 41% fall.
Write-downs by US financial institutions certainly haven’t yet factored in that degree of possible fall in housing values, and as Wilson Sy, the cheif economist at APRA, pointed out recently in two brilliant research papers (1 2), the banks’ “stress test” modeling greatly under-emphasizes the impact of such asset price falls on their financial viability. House price falls in the USA are far from over, and likewise “unexpected” write-downs by US financial institutions.
Figure 3
Overall, if US markets fall back to their pre-Bubble levels, the stock market will plunge about 80% from its peak (much the same degree of fall as applied in Japan) and the housing market will fall 55% (rather more than happened in Japan, where average house prices fell 44%–but less than Tokyo, where they fell over 70%).
The unique feature of this US asset bubble is that it affects both stocks and houses. There have been three Stock Market Bubbles in the USA in the last century: the “usual suspects” of the 1920s and 1980’s, but also one that doesn’t normally rate a mention: a ’60s Bubble that peaked in 1966, and was followed by a slump that only ended in mid-1982 (see Figure 6).
As Figure 6 indicates, this dual bubble has no precedent. Not only is it a bubble in both asset markets, both bubbles dwarf anything previously experienced. Even the great Roaring Twenties stock market bubble barely pokes its head above the long term average, compared to the 2000s Stock Market bubble–and in the 1920s, as Figure 4 shows, the housing market was relatively undervalued. The over-valuation of today’s housing market far exceeds the now comparatively minor bubble when Keating (Charles, not Paul) was on the loose in the USA.
Figure 4
While the Australian Stock Market is not as severely overvalued as the American, it is still substantially over its long term trend. Even after the recent falls, the inflation-adjusted All Ordinaries Index exceeds its level before Black Tuesday in 1987. It has another 30% to go before it will have reverted to the mean of the last 25 years (see Figure 5).
Figure 5
The prognosis for the Australian housing market is substantially worse. Even on short term data–covering only the last 22 years–the market could fall 40% if it reverted to the mean, and 50% if it reverted to the pre-bubble mean. Nigel Stapledon’s research into long term house prices in Australia–which is not shown here–implies an even greater potential for a fall in house prices.
Figure 6
Of course, such talk can seem nonsensical and alarmist. Especially if you ignore what happened in Japan.
Japan: the world’s most recent debt-deflation
Japan clearly underwent a debt-deflation after its “Bubble Economy” spectacularly burst in 1990. In its aftermath, house prices across Japan fell on average by 42%, and by over 70% in Tokyo (though they have since recovered slightly).
Figure 7
Figure 8
What has happened there can happen in Australia, the USA, and the rest of the OECD–especially since our Bubbles, while smaller than the Tokyo bubble, are larger than that for Japan as a whole (see Figure 9).
Figure 9
The killer behind the Bubble: Debt
The level of over-valuation of asset markets reflects the unprecedented scale of private debt, both here and in America–since the vast bulk of that debt was undertaken to finance “Ponzi” speculation on shares and housing. This is the reason that this recession will be so severe–as will the asset market bust.
Every “recovery” from a debt-induced recession since 1970 has involved resumption in the tendency for debt to grow faster than GDP (see Figure 12, where the once seemingly major debt crisis of the late 80s is now just a pimple on the upward trend of the debt ratio to its current unprecedented level).
Yet today the debt to GDP ratio is more than twice that of the Great Depression. It is simply cannot go any higher. Who else, after all, can banks lend to, now that they have exhausted the “subprime” market?
The only way for the debt to GDP ratio now is down (unless we’re unlucky enough to experience deflation, in which case the ratio will rise further, as in the Great Depression), and as it heads down, so will output and employment. A serious recession is inevitable.
Welcome to “the recession we can’t avoid”.
Figure 10
An “unexpected” fall in retail sales
Retail sales fell sharply in June, taking most economic commentators by surprise. Even perennial optimists, such as Shane Oliver, were forced to consider that the odds of a recession were “at least 40 percent”.
In reality, the fall in retail sales was inevitable. Spending in Australia has been driven by the biggest debt bubble in our history, and when that bubble peaked, spending had to fall. Since households had taken on a far larger share of debt than business during this bubble, the impact was bound to be seen first in retail sales, rather than investment spending, as I pointed out in November 2006:
“If households reduce their debt levels smoothly, they will have less disposable income to spend and retail sales will slump. If bankruptcies become widespread, the sales downturn will be overlaid with a financial crisis.” (Debtwatch, November 2006, p. 18;
See http://www.debtdeflation.com/blogs/p...twatch-reports
The suddenness of the turnaround is also no surprise, when you look at the data from a financial point of view. Just as your personal spending each year is the sum of your net income plus the change in your debt, aggregate spending for the economy is the sum of GDP plus the change in debt. As debt rises, the contribution made to spending by any change in debt also rises. Private debt–and household debt in particular–has risen so much in Australia that, at its peak, the change in debt was responsible for almost 20 percent of aggregate demand.
Figure 11
As is obvious in Figure 1, debt’s contribution peaked at the end of 2007, and it has been falling ever since. The monthly figures make this even more obvious (Figure 1 records change in debt over a whole year). The monthly increase in total private debt peaked at $30 billion in mid-2007, and trended up to $27 billion by the end of 2007. It has since fallen to a mere $5 billion in the month of June (see Table 1 and Figure 12).
Table 1
Figure 12
At some point, it will turn negative, and change in debt will therefore substract from aggregate demand rather than adding to it. Given that at its peak, debt financed almost 20 percent of demand, even stabilising debt at its current level–$1.85 trillion, compared to a GDP of $1.1 trillion–would result in a 20 percent fall in aggregate demand.
This hit will be felt by both asset and commodity markets: asset prices will fall, as will output and employment. The government’s attempts to counter this–by running a deficit rather than a surplus–will initially be swamped by the sheer scale of the turnaround in debt-financed spending. Even if the government runs a deficit of A$20 billion–the same scale as this year’s intended surplus–it will make up for less than a tenth of the fall in debt-financed spending.
The current “credit crunch” is, therefore, only the first act in a long-drawn out process of reducing debt levels. The second act will be “the recession we can’t avoid”. That recession–which will affect most of the OECD, since all major OECD nations bar France have suffered a similar blowout in private debt levels–will only add to the current decline in asset prices.
iTulip Select: The Investment Thesis for the Next Cycle™
__________________________________________________
To receive the iTulip Newsletter or iTulip Alerts, Join our FREE Email Mailing List
Copyright © iTulip, Inc. 1998 - 2007 All Rights Reserved
All information provided "as is" for informational purposes only, not intended for trading purposes or advice. Nothing appearing on this website should be considered a recommendation to buy or to sell any security or related financial instrument. iTulip, Inc. is not liable for any informational errors, incompleteness, or delays, or for any actions taken in reliance on information contained herein. Full Disclaimer
__________________
Ed.
Last edited by FRED; Yesterday at 06:47 PM.
SEMINARIO PARA ABOGADOS EN DEFENSA DE EMBARGOS HIPOTECARIOS
Workshop Attendance Mounting: Questions Answered — Register Now and Make More Money Than You Ever Did Before Practicing Law
August 5, 2008 · No Comments
The tide is turning. Several states have taken formal and informal steps from changing the rules to changing the law to stop or slow foreclosures. You had better know what all this means as more and more states follow Ohio, New Jersey, Maryland, Florida, California, Georgia etc. The nuclear option — giving homeowners title free and clear of the mortgage is moving closer to the top.
Here are the answers to the most common questions about why to attend the workshop:
1. The average case should bring in at least $15,000-$20,000 in fees, some on the front end with most at the back end.
2. Coming to the workshop will assure you of getting referrals. I have some lawyers I am referring as many as 15 cases per week. Do the Math.
3. You will learn litigation skills and win more cases than you ever thought possible.
4. You will be a successful warrior for the common people — standing out from your colleagues who just don’t get it.
THE GARFIELD CONTINUUM: THE STRATEGY FOR TOTAL VICTORY AGAINST THE LENDERS IN THE CURRENT FORECLOSURE MARKET
SECURITIZATION AND MORTGAGE DEFENSE/OFFENSE WORKSHOP
September 4, 2008 (9AM TO 5PM)
LOEWS HOTEL, SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA
IN 2009, 14 MILLION HOMEOWNERS WILL DEMAND THEIR HOMES FREE AND CLEAR
WILL YOU BE READY TO REPRESENT THEM?
REGISTER NOW - PayPal, Visa, MasterCard
The conspiracy to defraud homeowners will be thrown to its knees, and lenders will be called upon to produce the note or let the property go.
If you know anything about mortgage backed securities, the answer is clear. Precedent setting orders/opinions in New York, New Jersey, Michigan, Florida, Ohio and other states have already decided in favor of the homeowners – with more following every day.
Welcome to the emergence of mortgages interwoven the new world of derivatives, asset backed securities, credit market vehicles, ratings and appraisal practices, issuance of negotiable instruments, and administrative rules and regulations on the state and federal level.
Are your legal skills up to the challenge? Or are you malpracticing, unaware of this legal new world order called securitization?
If your practice has anything to do with bankruptcies, foreclosure, or real estate, be prepared to be sued yourself for not knowing the myriad state and federal laws that protect homeowners from predatory lenders. Further, there is now a proven legal strategy for not only protecting homeowners, but establishing legally that they already own their homes free and clear of all mortgage encumbrances.
Major changes in real property law and foreclosure defense arose as a result of the securitization of loans. This presents a huge opportunity for attorneys to enlarge their practice, win more cases, and earn substantial fees.
ATTORNEYS BEWARE: The typical predatory lender is in violation of an excess of a dozen statutory acts plus over twenty causes of action.
GARFIELD’S CONTINUUM workshop will teach you in one day how to upgrade your skills and embark on an exciting new legal journey, taught by Neil Garfield, who created the Continium, a combined and coordinated group of legal strategies that capitalize on the current securitization climate.
Held in sun-drenched Santa Monica, this exciting venue offers insight, invigoration and introspection, into the kind of practice you have, and the kind of practice you will create in response to a historical era in homeowner’s rights. Topics include the mortgage meltdown, securitization and its impact, foreclosure and bankruptcy old and new order, mortgage audits and strategies, defensive and offensive legal strategies, courtroom tools and winning arguments.
Perfect for litigators, mediators and judges, too.
WORKSHOP AGENDA
9:00-9:30 Past and Current Status of Mortgages, Notes and Foreclosures
9:30-10:00 Mortgage Meltdown
10:00-10:30 Securitization Process
10:30-11:00 Securitization Parties
11:00-11:30 Securitization Victims
11:30-12:00 Legal Consequences of Securitization
12:00-1:00p Special Lunch Forum: From the Lender’s Perspective: Guest Speaker Brad Kaiser
1:00-1:30 Overview of Defensive Strategies
1:30-2:00 Overview of Offensive Strategies
2:00-2:30 Ethical and Malpractice Considerations
2:30-3:00 Bankruptcy Errors and Omissions
3:00-3:30 Boots on the Ground: Getting the Word Out
3:30-4:00 Attorney Fees
4:00-5:00 Networking Q and A
5:00-7:00p COCKTAIL RECEPTION WITH NEIL GARFIELD AND ASSOCIATES
NOTE: LAYPERSONS AND THE MEDIA WILL NOT BE PERMITTED. NO AUDIO/VIDEO TAPING IS ALLOWED
CLE CREDITS: This course does not provide CLE credits
COST OF SEMINAR IS $595.00 PER PERSON, GROUP PRICE IS $495 FOR FIRM MEMBERS
TO REGISTER: click the link below or for more information email us at homeownerswar@aol.com
REGISTER NOW
Neil F. Garfield, M.B.A., J.D., 61, is the winner of dozens of academic awards, a popular speaker, and author of technical treatises on law and economics. He has come out of retirement with a bang and financial institutions should take note. He knows them from the inside out, who the deciders are, and how they arrived at a catastrophic scheme to defraud people, agencies, institutions and governments all over the world.
For more information on Neil Garfield visit his website at
http://livinglies.wordpress.com
August 5, 2008 · No Comments
The tide is turning. Several states have taken formal and informal steps from changing the rules to changing the law to stop or slow foreclosures. You had better know what all this means as more and more states follow Ohio, New Jersey, Maryland, Florida, California, Georgia etc. The nuclear option — giving homeowners title free and clear of the mortgage is moving closer to the top.
Here are the answers to the most common questions about why to attend the workshop:
1. The average case should bring in at least $15,000-$20,000 in fees, some on the front end with most at the back end.
2. Coming to the workshop will assure you of getting referrals. I have some lawyers I am referring as many as 15 cases per week. Do the Math.
3. You will learn litigation skills and win more cases than you ever thought possible.
4. You will be a successful warrior for the common people — standing out from your colleagues who just don’t get it.
THE GARFIELD CONTINUUM: THE STRATEGY FOR TOTAL VICTORY AGAINST THE LENDERS IN THE CURRENT FORECLOSURE MARKET
SECURITIZATION AND MORTGAGE DEFENSE/OFFENSE WORKSHOP
September 4, 2008 (9AM TO 5PM)
LOEWS HOTEL, SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA
IN 2009, 14 MILLION HOMEOWNERS WILL DEMAND THEIR HOMES FREE AND CLEAR
WILL YOU BE READY TO REPRESENT THEM?
REGISTER NOW - PayPal, Visa, MasterCard
The conspiracy to defraud homeowners will be thrown to its knees, and lenders will be called upon to produce the note or let the property go.
If you know anything about mortgage backed securities, the answer is clear. Precedent setting orders/opinions in New York, New Jersey, Michigan, Florida, Ohio and other states have already decided in favor of the homeowners – with more following every day.
Welcome to the emergence of mortgages interwoven the new world of derivatives, asset backed securities, credit market vehicles, ratings and appraisal practices, issuance of negotiable instruments, and administrative rules and regulations on the state and federal level.
Are your legal skills up to the challenge? Or are you malpracticing, unaware of this legal new world order called securitization?
If your practice has anything to do with bankruptcies, foreclosure, or real estate, be prepared to be sued yourself for not knowing the myriad state and federal laws that protect homeowners from predatory lenders. Further, there is now a proven legal strategy for not only protecting homeowners, but establishing legally that they already own their homes free and clear of all mortgage encumbrances.
Major changes in real property law and foreclosure defense arose as a result of the securitization of loans. This presents a huge opportunity for attorneys to enlarge their practice, win more cases, and earn substantial fees.
ATTORNEYS BEWARE: The typical predatory lender is in violation of an excess of a dozen statutory acts plus over twenty causes of action.
GARFIELD’S CONTINUUM workshop will teach you in one day how to upgrade your skills and embark on an exciting new legal journey, taught by Neil Garfield, who created the Continium, a combined and coordinated group of legal strategies that capitalize on the current securitization climate.
Held in sun-drenched Santa Monica, this exciting venue offers insight, invigoration and introspection, into the kind of practice you have, and the kind of practice you will create in response to a historical era in homeowner’s rights. Topics include the mortgage meltdown, securitization and its impact, foreclosure and bankruptcy old and new order, mortgage audits and strategies, defensive and offensive legal strategies, courtroom tools and winning arguments.
Perfect for litigators, mediators and judges, too.
WORKSHOP AGENDA
9:00-9:30 Past and Current Status of Mortgages, Notes and Foreclosures
9:30-10:00 Mortgage Meltdown
10:00-10:30 Securitization Process
10:30-11:00 Securitization Parties
11:00-11:30 Securitization Victims
11:30-12:00 Legal Consequences of Securitization
12:00-1:00p Special Lunch Forum: From the Lender’s Perspective: Guest Speaker Brad Kaiser
1:00-1:30 Overview of Defensive Strategies
1:30-2:00 Overview of Offensive Strategies
2:00-2:30 Ethical and Malpractice Considerations
2:30-3:00 Bankruptcy Errors and Omissions
3:00-3:30 Boots on the Ground: Getting the Word Out
3:30-4:00 Attorney Fees
4:00-5:00 Networking Q and A
5:00-7:00p COCKTAIL RECEPTION WITH NEIL GARFIELD AND ASSOCIATES
NOTE: LAYPERSONS AND THE MEDIA WILL NOT BE PERMITTED. NO AUDIO/VIDEO TAPING IS ALLOWED
CLE CREDITS: This course does not provide CLE credits
COST OF SEMINAR IS $595.00 PER PERSON, GROUP PRICE IS $495 FOR FIRM MEMBERS
TO REGISTER: click the link below or for more information email us at homeownerswar@aol.com
REGISTER NOW
Neil F. Garfield, M.B.A., J.D., 61, is the winner of dozens of academic awards, a popular speaker, and author of technical treatises on law and economics. He has come out of retirement with a bang and financial institutions should take note. He knows them from the inside out, who the deciders are, and how they arrived at a catastrophic scheme to defraud people, agencies, institutions and governments all over the world.
For more information on Neil Garfield visit his website at
http://livinglies.wordpress.com
Saturday, August 2, 2008
Se pude atacar al banco por fraude hipotecario?
La mayoria de los abogdos que se especializan en este renglon de la ley en los Estados Unidos declaran que uno de los elementos mas cruciales en su ataque contra el banco es el FRAUDE.
El fraude que pudiera haber sido perpetrado en inducirlo a firmar los documentos de cierre. Leyes como TILA (Truth in Lending Act), pueden darle a usted importantes herramoentas legales que podria utilizar en atacar al banco y logar una victoria.
para mas informacion visiten livinglies.wordpress.com
El fraude que pudiera haber sido perpetrado en inducirlo a firmar los documentos de cierre. Leyes como TILA (Truth in Lending Act), pueden darle a usted importantes herramoentas legales que podria utilizar en atacar al banco y logar una victoria.
para mas informacion visiten livinglies.wordpress.com
Tuesday, July 8, 2008
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